The paper introduces a connection between the needs of exchanges to respond to the immediacy needs of their clientele and the need to manage the credit risks faced by exchange members. Queueing theory is used to represent the opportunity loss suffered by brokers engaging in multiple activities: order-flow origination and its intermediation. The role of market-making locals is depicted as enabling specialization. Brokers focus on originating order flow and locals on fulfilling intermediation needs. The capacity to specialize is constrained by the availability of creditworthy members acting as locals. This results in a tension between pursuit of immediacy and managing inter-member credit exposure. Two exchange rules, tick size and price limits, are evaluated for their effects in resolving this tension.
I. Introduction
describes the development of modern futures clearinghouses as the culmination of a series of adaptations to credit risk problems. Baer, France and Moser (2001) extend this reasoning to show how contract margin requirements reflect the interests of exchange members who jointly minimize their credit risk exposures and their margin-carry costs.
Common to these papers is their application of a theory of efficient contract design to futures contracts. A contractual perspective on exchange membership is also useful. Viewed this way, exchange rules become terms to contracts of membership. In turn, those rules become subject to the same efficiency concerns as any other contract-design problem. This thought exercise gives insight into the economics that underlay exchange organizations. Just as members continually re-contract to control price risks arising from their extant financial positions, they also adjust exchange rules affecting their membership standings. This paper models linkages between exchange decisions affecting contract performance and meeting customer demand for immediacy. Immediacy is the time required for filling customer orders and, in this sense, the term describes the performance of transaction service providers. The duration of order-fill processing creates exposure to price changes, an exposure that increases as order-fill duration lengthens. This outcome is attributable to both information arrival and to market liquidity. More straightforward is information arrival: Informed traders want their orders filled before prices adjust to their information. Less straightforward is the added exposure to the price implications of liquidity. Liquidity is a conditional expectation of the association between the price response of a transaction and its size. As large transactions are more likely to move prices, liquidity descriptions are usually made in terms of the largest transaction having no expected price impact. Because long-duration order fills increase exposure to these price effects, poor liquidity elevates the importance of immediacy.
Immediacy needs are common to all exchanges. Securities markets are organized to facilitate brokered transactions with a combination of human and computer resources. Specialists holding limit order books provide a nexus for price discovery. Computerized order-handling meets most immediacy needs by using algorithms to match the buy and sell sides of most at-market orders.
Open-outcry futures markets are organized as continuous auction markets.
Immediacy is provided by locals tracking buy and sell interests on the floor; the transactions of locals serve to intermediate externally originating order flows.
Given the problems arising from a lack of immediacy, exchange members have interests in taking steps that reduce the problem. Increasing the number of members improves the number of opportunities to find a counter party within a time span. Selecting from a homogenous population of potential members, the choice is straightforward: add members until the immediacy problem goes away.
However, potential members are more likely to be heterogeneous, particularly so in their credit dimensions. Scarcity of strong credits among a population of potential members constrains immediacy improvements. This paper uses a queueing theory representation to quantify costs implied by inadequate immediacy and develops a trade off between these costs and the costs incurred when weak credits are accepted as members.
To see its relevance, consider how membership size affects an exchange member's interests. We readily see the benefit when our grocer opens another checkout line and decreases the portion of a Saturday spent standing in line.
Likewise, adding an exchange member can decrease time spent locating contract counterparties. This is to say that increasing the number of members improves transaction immediacy at a given price. From this, it follows that the cost for obtaining immediacy declines as membership size increases. From the perspective of individual members, every other member is a potential service channel and-like grocery check out lanes-more service channels are preferred to less.
On the other hand, adding members has risk management consequences. Baer, France and Moser (2001) show that monitoring members for their nonperformance prospects can substitute for collateralizing against losses. However, they find no evidence of differential collateral assessments as would be indicative of substantive reliance on monitoring. Collateral appears to be the primary risk-management tool and collateral requirements are the same for most members. This being the case, an increase in the riskiness of new members increases the collateral required from all members.
The literature on financial intermediation has not previously drawn from queueing theory to address financial structural issues. Indeed, use of the theory is infrequent in the general economic literature. Naor (1969) includes queue-residence time as a component of all-in product cost. De Vany (1976) introduces queueing theory to the industrial organization literature by incorporating wait time into monopoly pricing problems. In their analysis of the trucking industry, De Vany and Saving (1977) extend wait time costs to pricing in competitive markets.
The empirical study of Frech and Lee (1987) gauges the inefficient allocation of gasoline caused by use of wait time as a non-price rationing mechanism. Davidson (1988) shows how firms can use wait time preferences to segment service markets.
The next section illustrates concepts of the paper with a numerical illustration for an exchange comprised entirely of principals. Section III models an exchange whose order flow originates externally. Specialization arises as brokers work with external parties to develop order flow. Immediacy providers absorb order flow based on their abilities to track buy and sell interests among the brokers. Section IV relates exchange rules to efforts to improve the terms of the trade off between immediacy demands and exposure to risk. Price tick rules affect the share of revenue obtained by locals, adjusting these rules can affect local participation in a contract. Price limit rules limit the level of liquid resources required of locals. Section V develops some perspective on the policy implications of the model and summarizes the paper.
II. Exchange Membership Comprised of Principals
A simulation exercise provides an intuitive basis for this queueing representation. A population of potential exchange members is constructed and ordered by the expected losses incurred by surviving members when any single member fails. For this exercise, members trade for their own account only, that is, they trade as principals. Assuming the clearing organization requires full protection from expected losses, the required collateral level is the amount of loss exposure implied by the weakest credit permitted to join. Calibrating loss amounts to an S&P transition matrix of bond ratings adds some realism to the exercise. For each of the possible memberships of size N, the collateral required of all members is the expected loss on failure of the weakest credit. The opportunity cost is the alternative return that members can earn by investing their collateral elsewhere. For purposes of the simulation, this is 5% scaled to a contract value of 1000.
As suggested by the above discussion, adding members increases the number of service channels and decreases expected wait time. Using standard queueing results 1 , I calculate expected wait times for each possible membership size. Assuming wait time is mutually exclusive of other productive activity, the cost of time in the queue accrues at 5% per period. I normalize costs to the servicing cost for one contract servicing period. Thus, the all-in cost for one contract is the 5% incurred during the servicing interval plus a charge for time spent waiting. If the time spent waiting is 10% of the time spent processing, then the additional charge is ½% (= 5% x 1/10). The next section moves away from this specific parameterization and moves toward developing economic intuition for this perspective on a futures exchange.
III. Specialization Within an Exchange Membership
Memberships do not specify the activities of individual members, but members do specialize. Though the term "market maker" connotes a single market for all buy and sell activity, in reality "market makers" construe their markets much more narrowly. One market maker may be quoting a June- Observing the loan spreads available to potential members provides the exchange with useful information on their creditworthiness. Computing expected losses as above and ranking these lowest to highest (see Figure 1 ) provides the exchange with information relevant to its future collateral requirements.
Figure 1
On reviewing applicant i, member 0 favors the application when the following holds: e (r i -r f ) < e (r 0 -r f )
. This rule holds because adding the new member implies no increase in the costs of risk management. When e (r i -r f ) > e (r 0 -r f ) the new member poses a risk increase that must be managed and the membership incur costs associated with managerial effort. . When margin assessments are member specific, then collecting margin sufficient to cover the expected loss owing to that member's nonperformance does not increase costs for existing members. It follows too that when members cover risk-management costs introduced by their membership, prospects improve that existing members are more likely to favor their admission.
However, exchanges do not differentiate their margin assessments.
Instead, margin requirements are uniform implying that a membership may realize higher costs when admitting new members. 3 Member 0 calculates the cost added by admitting an additional member from three items: the increase in required margin, the rate of return that member 0 can earn on this amount, and the number of contracts on which the added amount will apply. 4 In a onemember-one-vote organization, members evaluate their benefit from adding new members. Decisions based solely on extra margin cost and immediacy improvements will admit new members up to the point where at least N/2+1 voting members expect positive net benefits.
The preceding characterization demonstrates a relationship between nonperformance costs and the number of memberships. Exchanges add brokers to bring order flow to the exchange, they add locals to improve the immediacy of order fills. Order flow and immediacy are linked through the extent to which immediacy permits brokers to engage in their specialties. Because the value added from order-flow origination is clear, the remainder of the paper focuses on the immediacy implications of adding locals.
The Value Added by Liquidity Providers
Locals add value by absorbing short-term, order-flow imbalances. A broker bringing a large order to the floor best serves client interests when the order is executed at an average price no less favorable than the market price when the order was given. Simultaneous arrival of identically sized and offsetting orders-a buy for every sell-is unlikely. More likely, the requisite order matches are dispersed amongst several brokers. "Working the order" is time consuming; that is, time spent locating selling brokers and negotiating prices detracts from the broker's efforts to bring additional order flow into the exchange. Locals, specializing in tracking existing buy and sell interests on the floor, take positions expecting to trade out of them. 5 The latter trade can be with a selling broker or another local.
6 Figure 2 provides a schematic detailing the order flow being modeled.
5 Locals carry positions for very short intervals. Silber (1984) calculates average holding periods for a sample of locals. He reports the average term of their positions is less than two minutes. 6 Trades with other locals are more frequent. Curran (2002) shows that during a 1997 sample period broker-to-broker transactions in the S&P 500 contract
Figure 2
For simplicity, I assume that one or more locals immediately take up orders introduced by brokers. In practice, these transactions are less immediate.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests this time is generally much smaller than the time spent by locals working their pieces of the order. The assumption represented 10% of contract volume. All other transactions were broker-to-local (65%), or local-to-local (25%).
Locals take portions of order.
Transactions between locals match buy sides with sell sides of order.
Buy order arrives at broker desk
Broker brings order to exchange floor.
Sell order arrives at broker desk
Broker brings order to exchange floor Locals take portions of order permits a simplification: I can represent order flow taken by locals as queued for matches with later-arriving orders.
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Initially, I also assume that locals take, at most, one contract. In queueing theory terms, this implies that a local represents one potential queue space. The assumption avoids two complications. First, it enables the analysis to focus on the marginal effect from adding queue spaces rather than the marginal effect of adding locals with each taking more than one order. Second, the assumption sidesteps comparisons of contract-nonperformance prospects for locals taking multiple contracts. 8 On establishing a tradeoff between immediacy and credit risk, the succeeding section then considers how exchange rules can affect the capacity of locals to carry more positions.
Moser (2002) size from increasing the number of service channels is, at first, relatively small.
As increasing the number of service channels improves the odds that arriving customers are immediately processed, expected queue size declines more rapidly. As the probability increases that a service channel will be open, queue length declines less rapidly. As before, a service channel is interpreted as a broker. Hence, increasing the number of its active brokers diminishes the need for locals to carry positions.
Figure 4
The following differential equation combines the effects of increasing queue capacity (dN, changes in the number of locals) and adding service channels (dc, changes in the number of brokers):
Solving for dN/dc obtains the needed increase in locals for a change in the number of brokers to obtain the same expected queue length. I evaluated the expression for various numbers of locals and brokers, finding that the number of locals increases, at increasing rates, in the number of brokers.
Cost-Minimizing Behavior
The previous two subsections identify quantities for two costly resources.
Managing credit risk entails pledging collateral against nonperformance. The cost of this resource is its use in other productive activities. Time, in particular time spent queued, is the second resource and its cost is the value of foregone activities. To equilibrate these resource costs, I re-state expected queue length as expected queue time as follows:
The intuition for the transformation is as follows. In equilibrium expected customer arrivals occur every λ time units. During that interval, those previously residing in the queue expect to advance one space. A counter example makes the case for this result. Were it not true, the system cannot be in equilibrium as either expected queue length continues to increase or the system goes to zero.
Hence, the expected time cost is the value of lost opportunities during queued intervals of length W q .
At the margin, the expected rate of return from foregone opportunities equals the expected rate of return from investment opportunities. 9 Were they not equal, resources would be re-allocated until meeting the equality condition.
Hence, the expected wait-time cost for member 0 is e r 0 Wq -1. Naturally wait time costs are increasing in W q , the rate of increase is r 0 e r 0 Wq >0. As shown previously, members can decrease queue length by increasing the number of 9 As before, risk neutrality is assumed.
service channels. It follows that increasing service channels obtains lower wait time costs.
However, scarcity of creditworthiness implies that adding members may require relaxing credit standards and lead to higher costs via greater risk management effort. For simplicity, the exchange manages credit risk entirely through collection of collateral deposits against contracts. Note that this implies that all members post identical collateral amounts. Hence, adding members increases costs for all members. The amount of cost increase incurred when member 0 takes on a new contract is: In conclusion, when immediacy services are scarce, exchange members are willing to pay substantially higher risk management costs to obtain improvements. As the scarcity of this service declines, their willingness to bear these costs also declines.
IV. Exchange Rules Facilitating Entry of Liquidity Providers
The previous section illustrates how exchange memberships resolve tensions between their immediacy needs and the effect that fulfilling those needs has on risk management costs. This section explores the separate interests of brokers and locals to obtain greater insight into the members' decision process.
A straightforward maximization of the expected profit argument establishes a 10 The model's construction doesn't permit consideration of partial memberships. However, exchange rules permitting "dual trading" do accomplish this. Although subject to certain customer-protection rules, exchanges permit members to trade as both a broker and a local. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange generally prohibits dual trading "in any contract month which is mature and liquid." (CME Rule 552.B) This is to say that the CME permits dual trading where immediacy services are most valued. Simple profit maximization strengthens this argument. Recalling the finite queue size developed in the previous section implies, on occasion, an exhaustion of the capacity of locals to accept positions. In these instances, brokers must choose between refusing the orders of current customers or accepting those orders and conducting their own market-making activities. I will assume that in expectations the cost of either is the same. This is tantamount to assuming the expected time to work an order precludes accepting the next order as well as assuming equal value added from either activity. Accepting the second of these assumptions seems reasonable, the first is less reasonable for several reasons. First, brokers working their orders have stepped out of their specialties. It is unlikely that their efforts in a market-making capacity will be equally profitable. Second, a market that has used up its immediacy capacity is likely to be a fast market. In these instances, time required to work the order is likely to increase while time between order arrivals decreases. Hence, the assumed equality of costs for the brokers' alternatives probably understates the brokers' interests for improved immediacy.
Recalling that N is defined as system capacity, let P N be the probability of N customers being present; i.e., all service channels and queueing capacity are in use. Having no additional capacity, brokers must reject new orders until queue space becomes available. Queueing theory refers to this as "balking." In such cases, broker profit is nil. During less congested periods, brokers obtain profit denoted π, these times occur with probability (1-P N ). Hence, expected broker profits can be stated in queue-capacity terms as follows:
Increasing queue capacity clearly reduces the probability of balking and increases profits, i.e., ( )
Taking expectations and squaring both sides obtains the variance of cash holdings:
So the extent of price variability resulting from the local's net position determines the volatility of changes in cash holdings. The next two subsections provide two routes for affecting the local's willingness to increase the supply of immediacy services.
Tick Size as a Means of Compensating Locals
Exchanges define tick sizes as the minimum amount of nominal price change. Table 2 illustrates with examples for several well-known contracts. The pricing units used by the underlying cash markets determine tick sizes. This convention, because it eliminates the need to restate futures prices, facilitates futures trading by parties having on-going positions in the underlying market. The product of the pricing interval and the notional value of the futures contract obtain the dollar values implied by each minimum tick size. For example, the S&P 500 pricing interval is 1/100 of an S&P point. The notional value of that contract is 250 times the S&P 500, the product (0.01 * 250) is $2.50.
The minimum tick size is 10 pricing intervals for a dollar value of $25.00.
Consider two possibilities: the contract trades at its pricing interval of 2.50 or at its minimum tick size of 25.00. The bid-offer prices quoted by locals will be multiples of 2.50 or 25.00. At a 2.50 pricing increment, the bid-offer spread can be bid down as low as 2.50. At 25.00, the bid-offer spread can only be bid down to 25.00. In exchange parlance, both are "one-tick markets." The first implies local compensation is $2.50 per trade, the second gives compensation of $25.00
per trade. The effect of choices between these alternatives on the supply of locals is straightforward.
Tick-size contract specifications amount to a form of price-administration having two effects. 11 First, recognize that perceived instances of market failure are an important motivation for administering prices. In the present instance, the minimum tick size assures that the supply of immediacy-providing locals will be higher than may result were the minimum lower. In terms of the value of a local's position, price administration prevents the local from incurring a marketdetermined bid-offer rate below 25.00. Recalling the earlier point that exchanges do not manage member specialties, the exchange must rely on incentives to adopt needed specialties. This floor on per-contract compensation improves the revenues of locals provided contract volume is sufficiently inelastic to its consequent bid-offer spread.
Second, noting that price variation accumulates over time, minimum price increments increase the time a local has to reverse out of a position. Referring to the above example, define average deviations in equilibrium prices for oneminute holding periods as 2.50. A local can expect no less than 5 minutes to offset a position before equilibrium price changes can be expected to round up (or down) to the next allowable pricing increment of 25.00. Were the minimum price interval to be 2.50, the local has less than 1 minute to do so. 12 Locals seeking to avoid exposure to price changes will prefer contract terms that offer sufficient time to close out their positions Price Limits as a Means of Reducing Costs of Carrying Cash Balances Miller and Orr (1966,1968) Similarly, Telser (1986) relates the short-run adjustment process to the isomorphism between cash and futures contracts introduced. Facing a short fall in cash balances, the local chooses between an inventory adjustment and paying γ to replenish the cash account. Thus, reducing instances requiring replenishing of cash balances lessens the need for locals to adjust inventory.
Price limits establish ceilings on the cash amounts that can be required within a single trading day. To see this, consider a contract whose specifications call for dropping the price limit on the day following a day in which the close price Increasing the period over which a price shock can affect cash balances benefits a local in two ways. First, when the change results from an excessive response to a price shock, a price reversal can be expected. The local benefits by a reduction in cash needed to restore the account. Second, increasing the amount of time available to replenish the account increases opportunities to liquidate other holdings or to re-negotiate loan terms. In both instances, as developed in Moser (1986) , the local has the equivalent of a zero-interest loan from the winning side of the contract. Reducing the effective rate for carrying cash balances decreases the cost locals incur when they carry positions during volatile markets. Absent this cost reduction, locals might be expected to exit when prices become volatile having the effect of reducing immediacy as volatility rises. Kuserk and Locke (1996) show that locals are more likely to carry overnight positions when price limits are hit than when limits are not hit. This suggests the value of these implicit loans is sufficient to alter the behavior of locals, they continue to supply immediacy despite the risk they will face overnight exposure to price changes.
V. Policy Implications and Conclusion
Economic models affect policy choices by altering the way that we understand economic choices. Knowledge that a tax distorts choices in predictable ways gives the policy maker a sense of the cost and benefit implied by changes in the tax. It follows that improving the predictability of a response improves the policy maker's effectiveness. This is particularly important for the regulatory style referred to as "incentive compatible." This regulatory style rewards regulated firms for their compliance with social goals. As well-structured reward systems require full understanding of organizational structure, models that parsimoniously convey structural understanding are more conducive to effective regulatory policy. The key contribution of this paper comes through its illustration of linkage between immediacy levels supplied by exchange membership and the creditworthiness of their membership. Incorporating this perspective into the policy formulation process can improve its effectiveness at minimum by avoiding policy choices that conflict with already-present incentives.
Policy Implications
The fundamental cause(s) of the Market Break of October 1987 will probably never be understood, in part because the market mechanism itself became part of the problem. 14 What comes through clearly is the dramatic decline in the capacity of market makers during the Break. A second policy issue is the effect that electronic trading will have. On its face, the cost advantages of electronic trading are so great it is difficult to imagine open outcry having much of a future. However, the immediacy problems noted by Miller (1996) remain unsolved. This researcher believes that open outcry will persist as long as electronic trading operates as a messaging system.
Message systems speed up order routing but improving order routing is not sufficient for improving immediacy, orders must also be executed. prospective immediacy providers will require compensation proportional to the level of risk. At times, this cost may deter trading.
This is not to argue that electronic trading can't succeed, these are problems that can be overcome. Open outcry markets developed solutions for immediacy problems prior to their becoming subject to regulatory oversight.
Electronic exchanges must achieve similar innovations while satisfying their 
